Muslim Outreach — Indian Deobandis to Pakistani Deobandis
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2.  (S) Poloffs met on April 27th with  Pandit N. K. Sharma, former head of  Muslim Outreach during the Rao  government, who claims close ties to the  Gandhi family, as well as with  Maulana Mahmood Madani, an Indian MP who  heads the Deobandi political  organization Jamiat Ulema-e Hind (JuH).  Madani noted that the Deobandi  sects of Islam in India and Pakistan  share similar religious doctrines,  but differ widely on political  issues. India’s founders maintained  that religion should be kept  separate from politics and Indian  Deobandis embraced these principles,  while Pakistan’s founding Muslim  League tried to combine these spheres,  with Pakistani Deobandi support.  Madani said his organization did not  believe in violence and is  prepared to preach this message to Deobandi  Pashtuns both in Pakistan  and in Afghanistan. Madani said much of the  discussion with Rahman  centered around these efforts, and that the  meetings between Pakistani  and Indian Deobandis had gone well. While  normally they would get  caught up in heated arguments over Kashmir, this  issue did not come up.  Sharma said privately later that Madani wanted  to send 2,000 Ulema to  Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, broken  into groups of five, to  preach a non-violent form of Deobandi Islam.
Taliban Reconciliation
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3.  (S) Madani said Rahman had a second,  more pressing, issue he wanted to  discuss with U.S. officials, but he  was only interested in holding these  talks outside of Pakistan.
Madani emphasized that military efforts to destroy the Taliban would never succeed, and that only a negotiated settlement would end the conflict in Afghanistan. He said has had a bad reputation in Pakistani politics because of hi known ties to Taliban members. Madani explained that Rahman was interested in acting as a go between for the United States, to negotiate with the Taliban in order to bring them into the mainstream and peacefully into politics in Afghanistan. Madani said many of the Taliban were just caught up in the conflict and did not have a way out of it. Which Taliban members were willing to be involved and under what circumstances would have to be worked out in the negotiations.
Madani emphasized that military efforts to destroy the Taliban would never succeed, and that only a negotiated settlement would end the conflict in Afghanistan. He said has had a bad reputation in Pakistani politics because of hi known ties to Taliban members. Madani explained that Rahman was interested in acting as a go between for the United States, to negotiate with the Taliban in order to bring them into the mainstream and peacefully into politics in Afghanistan. Madani said many of the Taliban were just caught up in the conflict and did not have a way out of it. Which Taliban members were willing to be involved and under what circumstances would have to be worked out in the negotiations.
Politics in Pakistan and Bangladesh
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4.  (S) Madani said further that Rahman  wanted to become more important in  Pakistani politics and that U.S.  support of President Musharraf was not  helping to resolve the conflict  in Afghanistan. He said in contrast to  Musharraf, Rahman did not look  like he was beholden to the U.S., but  that Rahman in reality was more  moderate than Musharraf. He claimed  further that the JUI-F is gaining  ground, would pick up more power in  upcoming elections, and should be  allowed to play its rightful role in  the GOP. Further, Madani asked  that talks focus on bringing “like  minded” leaders into power in  Bangladesh. He said the discussions with  the U.S. should be three  pronged — first, Taliban reconciliation;  second, Rahman’s position in  Pakistan; and third, the elections in  Bangladesh. Sharma said later  that Rahman met with Sonia Gandhi, Prime  Minister Singh, NSA Narayanan,  as well as some opposition leaders,  including former Prime Minister  Vajpayee, and that all of them supported  these negotiations.
Why Not in Pakistan?
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5. (S)  Madani said Rahman could not  speak freely in Pakistan, that he would  say one thing in Pakistan and  something else in India if asked. Sharma  said it was important that  these talks happen outside of Pakistan for  three reasons: First, the  former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan was well  known and very close to  Musharraf. Second, Rahman would jeopardize his  position in the  Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) if he had these  discussions in Pakistan  because the Jamaat-Islamia (JI) disagreed with  him politically on these  issues, and that extremists in Pakistan would  threaten him. Finally,  Sharma said India wanted to play a role in the  negotiations, which they  could not do inside Pakistan. When asked,  Sharma agreed that a third  country, such as the United Arab Emirates,  could also be a viable  option.
6. (S) After Madani’s departure,  Sharma  pointed out that Madani is a highly revered leader in Pakistan  with  several million followers among the Deobandis. He emphasized that   Madani and Rahman’s combined influence, with U.S. and Indian backing,   could break the logjam in Afghanistan and bring the Taliban into the   peace process.
Sharma: A Note of Caution
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7.  (S) Comment: Sharma appears to  exaggerate his role in the talks, as well  as his influence over world  affairs. He claimed to have brokered peace  talks with the All Assam  Student Union for Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980′s as  well as to have  traveled to Iraq on behalf of “people in the U.S.” to  meet with Sadaam  Hussein before the Gulf War. Sharma also implied that  he had ties to  India’s intelligence agencies, and that talking to him  was tantamount  to talking to Indian decision makers directly. Sharma may  also have  been Indira Gandhi’s astrologer during her time as Prime  Minister. That  said, Maulana Madani — who accompanied Rahman on his New  Delhi trip —  is a member of Parliament and is a leader of one of the  most prominent  and influential Islamic organizations in India. While we  remain  skeptical that India — which has long supported members of the  Afghan  Northern Alliance — would support such a discussion with Taliban   leaders, we think Maulana Madani’s efforts, although overly ambitious,   reflect his seriousness. End Comment.
 

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